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Stephen Spender: British Painters

New Republic

THE WEST MUST DECIDE!

Can We Rearm Germany Without Splitting the Anti-Communist Alliance?

THREE VIEWS (P. 8-15)

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Washington Wire T. R. B.

We heard Ike's speech last week—trying to calm the nation's jitters—lying flat on our back in the third bed from the door in Georgetown Hospital. Our stay was fortunately brief but long enough to hear Ike's speech and to bring us up against the diurnities. A visit to a hospital is humbling; the sorest wound, we think, the loss of dignity and identity; the greatest recompense, the re-discovery of how good people can be to each other.

We wondered if the Ike speech would come through to our four-bed ward, but we shouldn't have worried; he was omnipresent. There were two portables there already before ours. Each bed had a canopy but these were swung back, for Ike came in visiting hours. Ike's voice came through occasional static of hospital apparatus. There were florists' sprays, hygienic bedside tables, militantly cheerful nurses, the faint whiff of ether, the man coughing in the next ward, the mood of instant sympathetic identification of each newcomer with the other patients. Our comrades were an assorted lot: the extrovert from the steel sheeting plant; the slow, vacant chap across the aisle whose leg had become infected again in his fire department duties; and Bill.

Bill was the heart operation case; he was the nurses' pet. It was easy to see each had taken a private pledge to try to help pull Bill through. His wife was quietly indomitable. He had been there for months; had months to go. He spoke slowly but distinctly. Under his pallor you saw he was a young man. One side was paralyzed by the operation, but there was a good chance it would come back. He had moved his big toe that very morning; it was the sensation of the corridor.

Ike's voice came through, telling us there were troubles but not to be dismayed. Amidst visitors, orderlies and chatter, we listened gravely. The voice spoke with simple frankness, quietly and moderately and not overdoing it. Under other circumstances this columnist might have been more critical; everything he said was true so far as he went but he left so much unsaid! The national hysteria he was trying to assuage was due, in part, to lack of action which he might himself have taken. Yet we listened and watched and—on the whole—approved in the intense little hospital world. As Ike appealed for calmness we looked across at Bill—the man whose heart doctors had manipulated—and felt with comfort of all the latent courage there is in the world. On balance, Ike's talk seemed healing and calming. The situation also suggested something else of interest to leaders who call for courage: how much of that commodity there is available, if only you know how to tap it.

From any normal criterion the question of whether the world is destroyed by H-bombs is more important than what happens to the Man from Wisconsin. It develops that the 10-day Mundt Committee hearings starting here April 22, and the Geneva conference dealing with Indo-China, H-bombs—and all those things—starting April 26, will be rival attractions. Our own journalistic attention, we must confess, will be largely focussed here in Washington. The building up of the McCarthy-Army row offers no historical parallel; it looks to us like an incomparably gaudy show, and we can't for our life figure how it will come out.

The picturesque McCarthy affair has already passed the bounds of legitimate nightmare. Now, just conceivably, it is reaching a climax, though the scared Mundt Committee will duck it if it can. Who could possibly have imagined the Sears episode—the former head of the Massachusetts Bar Association forgetting that he had made some few prior remarks prejudiced for McCarthy? Or who could have invented that juicy incident of the one-day postponement of the Senate hearing in order that Joe could be speaker at the Texas Independence Day rites, of all things, at invitation of oil depletion allowance millionaire H. R Cullen—an invitation which a couple of thousand Texas University undergraduates sought to kill. Then again, in New York on April 4, 6,000 members of the Roman Catholic Holy Name Society of the Police Department cheered McCarthy tumultuously in a reception during which Cardinal Spellman enters and hails the Senator. But on April 9, in Chicago, Bishop Bernard J. Sheil, auxiliary of Cardinal Stritch, utters such a blistering attack to a United Auto Workers' CIO conference as has probably not been delivered by an American Catholic prelate in years. It was a scorching, excoriating performance that had to be heard to be appreciated; snatches of it were played on radio by awed commentators all through the evening. The re-broadcast of two minutes of that Sheil attack in next fall's election might be devastating against Joe, we should suppose.

And this is just the start. Every member of the Mundt Committee knows what he risks in tangling with McCarthy; four other Senate committees have each tried it and the hysteria has grown in each case. Saltonstall, up for re-election in Massachusetts, wouldn't think of taking on the job; Mundt tried desperately to shake loose but is stuck with the affair. If Senators begin asking Joe about favors for Private Schine, how will they get around counter-demands as to whether they, too, ever asked embarrassing special favors?

Senator McCarthy makes plain that he will squirt venom; before this man is dragged from his hole everyone remotely connected with the inquiry will smell like a gas house. He is set with a great new bogie—he is readying an attack on atomic scientists like J. Robert Oppenheimer, for an alleged "18 months' delay" in the H-bomb as a plot to aid the Russians. It will be calculated to rouse every innocent in America against every foreign-name scientist—and against the whole lot of intellectuals generally. This may well be McCarthy's Masterpiece. What can Geneva possibly offer to compare with this? Where it will end we can't guess; we still suggest keeping your eye on hard-boiled Sen. John McClellan (D, Ark.), up for re-election from an area invulnerable to McCarthyism. McClellan's opponent says he has been too lenient to McCarthy. That's one vote against a whitewash anyway.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

The Real Betrayal

McCarthy is striking at the core of US defensive strength in the Atomic Age—the dedication and effectiveness of our scientists. His goal is petty and simple: to tear public attention from the Cohn-Schine mess. He has begun by charging that "traitors in our government" caused "an 18-month deliberate delay" in the development of the H-bomb. He will attempt to persuade Americans of a story of treachery at the highest level so grave as to make whatever excesses he himself has committed seem insignificant.

The situation is made to order for him: there was a delay—of some four months—in the H-bomb development while men deliberated. There were men bold enough to voice their convictions on the end result of preparation for a war of annihilation and others anxious to consider all views before taking so serious a step. There were no shades of sympathy for Communism—simply shades of doubt about the gains to the free world of pressing the shape of war further into frightfulness. To McCarthy these doubts themselves are treason.

McCarthy's first target will probably be Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the man who, perhaps more than any other as director of Los Alamos, brought in the era of atomic warfare, but who seriously questioned—both on moral and practical grounds—the desirability of producing an H-bomb. Prior to 1949, physicists disagreed as to whether a Hydrogen (fusion) bomb could be made, but research in the field was continuous. In 1949, Russia exploded an atomic (fission) device and the Atomic Energy Commissioner (now Chairman) Lewis Strauss insisted that we go all out to try to produce an H-bomb. The Commissioners split and called in the General Advisory Committee of scientists, of which Oppenheimer was chairman. Oppenheimer and a majority of our top scientists argued against Strauss. They felt that the tremendous expense involved in trying to develop an H-bomb would not be justified, that the money would be better spent on perfecting and stockpiling atomic weapons, since an H-bomb, if developed, would be relatively wasteful of scarce plutonium, an element necessary not only to atomic weapons but also atomic peacetime power. (H-power has no foreseeable industrial use.) Oppenheimer also suggested that here was an opportunity to prevent another gigantic arms race; that the US should take the lead in proposing a compact forbidding such a weapon.

When the treason of Klaus Fuchs was discovered, the possibility that Fuchs might have given Russia information on US hydrogen-bomb research caused Strauss and Gordon Dean, also of the AEC, to bring the debate to a decision. They placed the matter directly before President Truman. And in January, 1950, the President ordered the AEC to go ahead on the "superbomb." It is now thought that the Russians began work on the H-bomb 18 months before this, but no one in this country knew that at the time.

Oppenheimer continued to urge, on humanitarian grounds, that the H-bomb not be made and that every effort be taken to outlaw it. The debate developed within the bounds of propriety and reason until the Air Force took

Murrow, McCarthy and the "Booboisie"

The highlight of Senator McCarthy's attack on Edward R. Murrow was the statement that "our nation may well die because of that 18-month deliberate delay" in producing the hydrogen bomb.

This, of course, has nothing to do with Murrow, but never think it was futile; on the contrary, it probably scared the pants off five million boobs, and scaring the boobs is the heart and soul of the McCarthy political technique.

This is perhaps the most masterly exhibition of that technique as yet presented. The cheapest kind of joker can scare the dimwits by poking a hideous false-face at them, but it takes a master to set them sweating and quaking without even a false-face, without anything at all. Probably McCarthy is the only political contortionist in the country who could do it.

Note that the nation may die because of the delay in producing the bomb. The bomb has since been produced, but that isn't the point. There were 18 months, according to McCarthy, when we didn't have it and that vacuum is the fatality; in other words, we are to be blown up by the bomb that didn't exist.

Only McCarthy would have dared bet so heavily on the complete hollowness of the American skull, but the evidence that he knew what he was doing is impressive. This, like every other country, has a considerable population with a brain capacity on the simian level, but we seldom realize it because it is difficult to organize the monkey-brains into a cohesive idiot army. Fear is the only force that will bind them together, as even the lesser demagogues know; but their fears are not rational, and it is an exceptional warlock who fully appreciates that fact. The lesser kind cannot quite understand that the concrete-skulled are rarely terrified by a real and present danger, such as the Red Army, but only by voodoo stuff. Yet it is exactly in proportion as ghost-stories supplant facts that their panic increases; and it took a McCarthy to realize that by eliminating even the ghosts and presenting complete nothingness—to wit, the bomb that wasn't made—he could drive them into mania.

It was a superb stroke of demagogy, and it will go far toward answering the question, how silly can a saphead get?

Gerald W. Johnson

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offense at Oppenheimer's argument that its policy of depending upon the deterrent effect of a "retaliation policy" to the virtual exclusion of means for continental defense promised a slaughter of civilians if Russia should choose war.

A few Air Force hotheads feared, quite wrongly, that Oppenheimer and other scientists were endangering the appropriations for the Strategic Air Force, so articles denouncing Oppenheimer and ridiculing the continental defense approach appeared simultaneously in the Air Force magazine and in an anonymous series of articles in Henry Luce's *Fortune* in the summer of 1953. The articles were charged with innuendos and slurs. Shortly afterwards, the Administration, the Air Force and the Luce publications all did an abrupt about-face on continental defense, but the picture of Oppenheimer presented by *Fortune* remains, to serve McCarthy.

For Oppenheimer, a gentle, soft-spoken man, is vulnerable in the era of McCarthyism. His brother Frank once belonged to the Communist Party. His wife's first husband died in Spain fighting against Franco and subsequently his death was exploited by a suspected Soviet agent, Arthur Alexandrovich Adams, in an effort to gain the co-operation of Dr. Oppenheimer who by then was chief of the California atomic project. Oppenheimer went at once to General Groves who handled all security. Groves kept him at his job.

There are, of course, other atomic scientists such as Philip Morrison who have been accused of Communist sympathy. Among other men, including David Lilienthal and Dr. J. B. Conant, who joined with Oppenheimer in questioning the wisdom of producing H-bombs are useful targets for McCarthy. Beyond them he seeks to exploit the latent anti-intellectualism of some Americans, the spirit voiced by an organ of the California Republican Party which last week condemned Albert Einstein as a "free-loading refugee" who had taken more than he had given to America, and then betrayed it by advocating non-co-operation with Congressional committees.

This new attempt to obscure the truth by whipping up unreason will demand restraint and self-discipline of Americans and their press—they cannot afford to forget that Oppenheimer and other men like him are those who convinced a very reluctant government to try to develop an atom bomb in the first place; that they have been and continue to be indispensable to us as a nation; and that the fantastic speed which has marked the development of both atomic and hydrogen weapons has been made possible by their dedication to the kind of free society in which science is able to fulfill its function of unrestricted exploration. They have taken upon themselves a terrible burden of conscience to give that society the best, if the most horrible, weapons to ensure its survival.

Scientists are not "organized," but they showed a collective indignation over the AD-X2 fiasco which involved injustice to a relatively obscure member of the profession. The attack being prepared by McCarthy will be aimed at a man who holds the very highest honors in his field and to whom the country owes a debt of gratitude. Two consequences are possible: the scientists who have gathered here from all over the world to work for us because they think of this country as the citadel of free inquiry, may slacken their efforts in a disillusionment which will spread down through the ranks of science; or the other top scientists will gather around Oppenheimer and there will be a battle royal between minds probably as civilized as any in the world and the embodiment of the mentality of prehistoric man. A great deal will depend upon which occurs, and, if the second, upon who wins.

A New Strong Voice

IN RECENT years liberalism in the Catholic clergy in America has been more often expressed in Chicago than New York.

In 1939 Bernard J. Sheil, Bishop of Chicago, was the first major prelate of his Church to denounce Father Edward Coughlin's anti-Semitism. Others took courage from him. Now Bishop Sheil has directly attacked McCarthy. Making clear that he was expressing only "my personal opinion," Bishop Sheil told a United Auto Workers conference on April 10:

> If a man is truly anti-Communist, he is concerned with meeting the challenge of Communism on every level. He is interested first of all, in seeing to it that conditions here and abroad are such that they don't provide a fertile breeding ground for Communism. He is interested in such matters as seeing to it that people get enough to eat, have decent homes, are able to raise their children in dignity. His scope is broad. . . .
>
> I judge an anti-Communist — the real thing, not the cops-and-robbers version—by how well he does these things. If he happens to be a legislator, I look at his record. . . .
>
> On the question of internal subversion, I judge an anti-Communist according to how well he does the very difficult job of seeking out subversives, clearly identifying them and removing them from critical positions. I take it that a genuine anti-Communist is one who despises the court methods of the Communists. I take it he hates the Communist idea that one is guilty until proved innocent. I take it that the genuine anti-Communist is one who above all believes in the democratic

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procedures and is willing to stand by them. . . .

As you can see, I take a pretty dim view of some noisy anti-Communists—one in particular, the Junior Senator from Wisconsin. I hate to see anti-Communism identified with this kind of playing for the grand-stands.

. . . I know that there are many in my Church who do not agree with me on this. So be it. Time will tell which of us is right. But although the Church takes no position, and will not, on such a matter of public controversy, the Church does take a position on lies, calumny, the absence of charity and calculated deceit. These things are wrong—even if they are mistakenly thought of as means to a good end. They are morally evil and to call them good or to act as if they were permissible under certain circumstances is itself a monstrous perversion of morality. . . .

While You Weren't Looking

Spring—1954 Something has upset the members of the House of Representatives profoundly. Proceedings in the chamber have taken on an unreal quality. Words continue to roll, of course, but they seem to have even less relation than usual to the subject at hand. And while members are still observed rising to make motions and raise points of order as of old—they appear detached from the proceedings, not really interested. For example, action on the Administration's housing bill.

The Committee on Banking and Currency, under tight Republican control, apparently forgot for one mad moment who was President and reported out a bill which chopped Eisenhower's request for 35,000 low-cost units a year for four years (total: 140,000) to 20,000 a year for one year. Then, when this bill (HR 7839) reached the floor—and a Democratic attempt to replace the President's figures had been defeated by Republicans and Dixiecrats — one dreamy gentleman, Rep. Howard Smith (D, Va.), rose to make a point of order. His point was his desire to end the housing program right now. He objected to the figure 20,000—wanted it out. Out it went. The gentleman subsided, pleased, until someone told him that his action had in effect authorized the construction of all units already contracted for—some 33,000. Mr. Smith seemed surprised.

Rep. Wingate Lucas (D, Tex.) then rose and suggested that the bill be amended to give "preference" in the selection of public-housing tenants not to families displaced by slum clearance, not families whose children might be saved from delinquency by a better home, but to "recipients of [government? private? industrial? professional?] old-age pensions." The amendment passed. No debate.

Another member — John W. McCormack (D, Mass.) — rose and presented an amendment requiring all tenants of public housing and all holders of government-insured mortgages to sign sworn affidavits that they had never belonged to any organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General. It passed. No debate. The sponsor murmured that the approved amendment clearly covered people already in public housing and that these would have to get out if they refused to sign. Nobody noticed that such an interpretation would be unconstitutional.

Then the members pulled themselves together and had a debate. The issue: granting the President authority to raise or lower interest rates, down payments, terms of repayments, and maximum amounts of government-insured mortgages. This was the heart of the Administration's housing concept, proposed as a stimulant to private building. Bang! The House woke up; for one part of this provision would empower the President to raise interest-rates on new GI mortgages; and veterans in election years are the most revered of all sacred cows; so an amendment to strike out the *entire* provision was offered. It passed.

When the effect of his amendment was explained to Wright Patman (D, Tex.), he too seemed surprised.

Slash This year the private power lobby officially known as the National Association of Electric Companies, disclosed that during the previous 12 months it had collected and spent $547,789, *double the amount spent by any other lobby.*

As the report containing this admission, required by law, was issued in one room of the capital, the House of Representatives was acting, in another, on the annual appropriations bill for the Interior Department—slashing the funds for public power agencies to which the private power lobby is allergic.

The Bonneville Power Administration which in fiscal 1952 received $73 million (all reimbursable), was given $23 million and instructions that indicate liquidation. The Bureau of Reclamation was cut from a 1952 level of $234 million to $140 million.

Administration apologists say that the laws and policies on public power have not been changed. They have not. They won't be. This country, by statute, still believes in low-cost public power. But as the "practical" men of the lobby point out, why do things the hard way by asking for changes of law and policy when there is an easier way? It makes no difference what laws and what policies regulate a non-existent program.

Boost No mention of it in the press, but the Atomic Energy Commission has just refused to carry out a suggestion made by President Eisenhower in his January budget message.

The President had proposed that the Commission negotiate with private power companies for 500,000 to 600,000 of kilowatts previously purchased from the publicly-owned TVA.

Reporting on the negotiations to the House Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations, AEC's General Manager, K. D. Nichols said he has received a joint bid from the Southern Company and the Middle-South Utilities Company, which, if accepted, would require the Commission to pay $4,038,000 a year more than it now pays TVA for the same amount of power.

If the higher cost is to be justified, said Nichols, "someone must show advantages to the AEC or over-all advantages to the United States." The decision to spend more for the same service, he declared, cannot be taken "solely within the AEC; Congress could do it or possibly higher executive authority."

To date, neither Congress nor the White House has made a decision; but the White House *has* ordered the Atomic Energy Commission to increase its production of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which means more electric power will be needed. If TVA capacity to produce additional power is not increased (and the Administration has made it impossible for this to be done), the exorbitant prices of the private power companies *will* have to be met.

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Wire-Tap: The House Approves

If the Senate agrees, old evidence — gathered illegally — will be admitted in our courts.

by Alan Westin

THE House of Representatives has passed a bill authorizing the FBI and military intelligence units of the Armed Services to intercept telephone communications in certain national security cases. Application to tap these wires must be made to a federal district judge; the wire-tap evidence obtained may be presented in criminal prosecutions; and wire-tap records which were obtained prior to this Act, on orders of the Attorneys General, are now made admissible in the federal courts. With the final vote of 377 to 10, the first round in one of the most confused debates in Congressional history came to an end, and what may be one of the most vital chapters in the future of American freedom was opened.

From the initial statement of House Majority Leader Charles Halleck in the debate on April 7, the scene on the House floor looked like a comedy of mistaken identity. To begin with, the Republicans refused to call their measure a "wire-tapping" bill at all, even though the proposal came right out of months of hearings on "Wire-Tapping For National Security" held by a Judiciary Subcommittee. HR 8649, declared Halleck, was the Anti-Traitor Bill. "A lot of people who are opposed to it are calling it a wire-tapping bill," he said, but this, of course, was a "complete misnomer," for any fool could see that "in fact this is an anti-traitor bill."

As interesting as the conflict over the bill's title was the remarkable fluidity of the positions taken by the floor leaders for each party. Last May, at the hearings on wire-tapping, Rep. Kenneth Keating (R, N.Y.) repeatedly declared that a system which placed wire-tapping in the discretion of the Attorney General was inadequate, that a court order was essential to prevent "mere spying and fishing expeditions" and to provide adequate safeguards for the system. The six member subcommittee which Keating headed accepted the Keating court-order bill unanimously. Then, without warning, Keating suddenly withdrew his bill and offered as a substitute an Attorney General system, with a new section which retroactively legitimatized wire-tap evidence already gathered by the Justice Department. Requiring court approval, said Keating, would seriously hamper our law enforcement—so a last-minute conference with Attorney General Brownell and J. Edgar Hoover had convinced him. "Those who would destroy us are clever, resourceful, and unscrupulous. They will stop at nothing. They do not deserve kid-glove treatment." Thus, after a full committee vote on party lines, Representative Keating was found leading the fight for an Attorney General system of wire-tapping.

In May, at the wire-tap hearings, Rep. Emanuel Celler (D, N.Y.) vigorously attacked the court-order approach as faulty for reasons of speed, secrecy and uniformity. "I have every confidence in the present Attorney General," Representative Celler declared, "and I would implicity give this authority to the Attorney General without the slightest equivocation, without the slighest hesitation." On April 7, Representative Celler was leading the Democrats in offering an amendment to require a court order in place of Keating's "substitute" Attorney General system.

When the debate opened, Republican speakers quoted Democrat Celler on the virtues and delights of Attorney General authorizations and Democrats read from Representative Keating's testimony on the value of a court order. Congressman Halleck heckled Democrats by pointing out that both President Roosevelt and President Truman had "recommended and endorsed" a wire-tapping bill; while Rep. Sidney Yates (D, Ill.) showed that it was Republican opposition, including that of Mr. Halleck, which had killed just such a wire-tapping bill in 1941. The final note of unreality was reached when Rep. Martin Dies (D, Texas) delivered an impassioned plea for privacy of telephone communications and the preservation of our separation of powers principle. "I further submit," Dies thundered in superb oratory, "that we ought to use every precaution we can to guard against invasion of the fundamental and God-given rights of the American people."

On the second day of the House discussion, the parliamentary situation became even more complex. In an attempt to beat off the Democrats' court-order substitute, Representative Halleck placed before the members an amendment to give the FBI, without need to consult either the courts or the Attorney General, power to tap wires on its own recognizance. "Some of you people over there," Halleck told the Democrats, "do not

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Alan Westin, a graduate of Harvard Law School and a member of the District of Columbia Bar, has written on wire-tapping for the Harvard, Yale *and* Columbia Law Reviews.

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seem to like Herb Brownell and some of you have recollections of McGranery and McGrath. But everybody has confidence in the FBI, so they say." (Heavy opposition forced Halleck to have his amendment withdrawn.) Then, Rep. Thomas Dodd (D, Conn.), a former FBI agent, introduced an amendment to require more safeguards in the wire-tapping bill—a one-year termination date for the act, and the requirement of reports by the Attorney General on his wire-tap applications and operations. (This was defeated 155 to 77.) Rep. Thomas Curtis (R, Mo.) put in, as an amendment, the original Keating court-order bill, which did not include a section permitting the Attorney General to use in court wire-tap evidence previously obtained. (This failed, 213-37.)

Finally, a roll-call vote was taken on the Willis court-order amendment offered by Rep. Edwin Willis (D, La.), and a bipartisan vote of 221 to 166 resulted in amending HR 8649 to include the court warrant as a prerequisite for tapping. As amended, the "anti-traitor bill" passed with only 10 votes opposing it.

Looking over this House action, two major points are clear. First, the sudden reversal by Keating from a court-order bill to an Attorney General system represents much more than a capitulation to Brownell and J. Edgar Hoover (who has been disturbingly reluctant to permit federal judges to oversee FBI wire-tap operations). What lies behind this Republican policy shift was the realization by the Administration (read "Brownell") that the original Keating bill would not have permitted the use of accumulated wire-tap data. Brownell has stated that he has "in cold storage" several cases which—like the Harry Dexter White case—depend on wire-tap evidence. The intensity with which Majority Leader Halleck, Brownell and Keating, pushed the retroactive clause of the amended Republican measure is some indication of the political dynamite they expect this authorization to unleash.

Second, the Democrats were masterfully maneuvered into an absurd parliamentary position. Instead of waging a floor fight to write into the bill bed-rock safeguards such as Congressman Dodd offered, the Democrats were forced by the Keating switch to rally behind a court-order amendment. Although uneasy over the "cold storage" evidence, the Democrats felt that to oppose a retroactive clause would put them in the position of seeming to cover up treason and misconduct, so they wrote a retroactive clause as Section I of their own amendment. As one leading Democrat told this writer: "Sometimes, you get caught in a parliamentary squeeze; you fight for what you feel is right against what is wrong, and wake up to realize that you lost the real battle by accepting that alignment in the first place."

With the "anti-traitor bill" passed by the House, the future of wire-tapping now rests with the Senate. While Republicans will probably introduce another bill to have wires tapped at the Attorney General's discretion, it is highly unlikely that Senate Democrats will be as easily boxed as the House Democrats were. Senators McCarran and Kefauver have each pledged a fight against an Attorney General bill; Senators Morse, Hennings and others have promised a filibuster to kill *any* wire-tapping act. (Morse terms Brownell's wire-tap suggestions "a cover-up for lazy, inefficient, unimaginative, ruthless law enforcement administration.") In addition, the bill will have to go through the Senate Judiciary Committee, where William Langer reigns—unpredictable but apt to fight on wire-tapping not only as a civil liberties measure and a headline maker, but also as a way to square a few political debts with Brownell.

MEANWHILE, bills are being drafted for presentation to the Senate which would throw off the totally inadequate pattern of the House bill and would spell out the basic protections needed to make a wire-tapping act correctly limited. These include:

1. All wire-tapping not authorized by this Act will be made a crime, whether done by private or uniformed law breakers. Possession of wire-tap equipment in circumstances which make it clear that wire-tapping was intended will also be an offense.

2. All evidence obtained by wire-tapping in violation of the Act will be expressly barred from the federal courts. Unlawful divulgence of wire-tap data (for private or non-judicial use) will be an offense.

3. All equipment used for wire-tapping will be registered by the Attorney General and records kept of the personnel and progress of each mission. Unedited recordings will be preserved in a closed file by the Attorney General; to introduce wire-tap evidence in a federal court, those recordings must be made available to defense counsel. (The government and defendant could agree to delete irrelevant material or material injurious to third parties; the court would rule on motions to suppress material touching the national security.)

4. Each year, the Attorney General will be required to file a record listing the number of wire-taps sought, the number approved or denied by the courts, and the cases in which wire-tap evidence was employed. A federal grand jury would be impanelled once yearly to look into the operation of the wire-tap system and examine complaints.

5. As in the present House Act, tapping would be restricted to the FBI and the military intelligence, for crimes involving national security only and only upon a court order.

The real choice is not between "no wire-tapping" or "a wire-tapping act." At present, we have wholesale and unrestricted wire-tapping by all sorts of federal officers as well as private sleuths and the only restraint is that evidence so obtained cannot be used in federal prosecutions. What must be hammered out in the Senate is a bill authorizing wire-taps in security cases and in the same act, providing proper controls over legal wire-tapping while specifically and effectively forbidding illegal taps.

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GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT AND DEFENSE OF EUROPE

THREE VIEWS

Germans with Guns Can't Be Trusted

The French Will Fight - IF!

European Union Is Still Our Best Hope

WHEN, SHORTLY after the outbreak of war in Korea, France proposed the integration into a European Defense Community of her armed forces with those of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, the proposal was seen as more than a limited response to immediate fear of Soviet Military power. It *was* that, but it was more; it gave positive promise of a European renaissance, a leap into the future—away from the frustrations of ruinous European nationalisms.

The US cannot be accused of failing to wish the new project well. If there is fault, it lies perhaps in the largeness of American enthusiasm; for in recent months resistance to ratification of the EDC has increased in proportion to US pressure on its behalf.

Resistance there is — from Left to Right; and no amount of angry impatience will lessen it. In the last analysis any workable European Community must have not merely parliamentary ratification but active support of the peoples concerned.

Additional US military assurances to the French, who are weakened by war in Indo-China and worried both by cracks in their African empire and the resurgence of their traditional foe, Germany, might be required if France is to join the EDC.

But if EDC ratification must await firmer US military pledges (under which resistance to aggression would not occur only when *we* chose, or at places of *our* choosing), could the present Congress be counted on to approve binding advance commitments of such a nature?

The three articles which follow reflect different views toward rearmament of Germany, inside or outside an EDC framework. Yet, they share certain common assumptions:

(1) any supranational arrangement such as EDC must come to terms with deeply rooted national prides; (2) *some* form of collective defense is still needed in Western Europe; (3) if the US persists in demanding adoption of the present EDC formula, European resentment is likely to stiffen further; and, (4) preoccupation with the present Communist threat should not blind us to the possibility of Germany's again endangering the peace of the world.

In his contribution to the discussion, John Golay, who returned from Germany this month, chooses to view the EDC primarily in terms of the dangers of a rearmed Germany, a danger so compelling, he suggests, that it requires the abandonment of the EDC or *any* program which permits substantial German rearmament.

But, ask our Paris correspondent and James King in their articles, can the risks of a resurgent, aggressive German nationalism be avoided by standing still, endeavoring (probably unsuccessfully) to bottle up the remarkable energy of the German people?

At this moment, the quarrel within the West about European defense, reports Mr. Gorrell, "is about means, not about ends." If that is so, Western statesmanship must prove competent to find a formula for defense which, while it may involve modification or even abandonment of a particular blueprint, manages to serve the *ends* which originally inspired the EDC.

Nothing could better serve Soviet ends than dead-end disagreement over means between the US and her European and British allies. A united Europe *must* come, but it may not develop in the manner planned; and an

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integrated European defense may turn out to be a result rather than a cause of this unity.

What matters most is that the Western alliance not be further weakened. If there is to be a US (or European) reappraisal of EDC—and it need not be an "agonizing" one if it is made in consultation with our friends—let it begin by appreciating that the area of essential agreement within the non-Soviet world is great; and that the principal task of our diplomacy is to find means of enlarging, not narrowing, that area.

Germans with Guns Can't Be Trusted

by J. F. Golay

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, preoccupied with the menace of Soviet power, has become accustomed to regarding the European Defense Community as the magic solution to the defense problem in Europe and to forget that there are serious risks in rearming the Western part of a divided Germany. EDC was devised by the French in response to an American desire for the rearmament of Western Germany in the days after the beginning of the Korean War, when any addition to the strength of the West seemed worth considerable risk. The pressures of those days have abated and many of the French, for whom Germany is a problem of first priority, are reconsidering their position. We also would do well to think again.

The rearmament of Western Germany will almost certainly mean the end of any chance of reunifying Germany by four-power agreement; but it will not be the end of the problem of German reunification. It cannot be supposed that once the means of conducting a German policy are in their hands (*i.e.*, German divisions exist to support their diplomacy), the Western German government and people will be content passively to submit to the division of their country indefinitely. They will surely embark upon a policy aimed at bringing about reunification and the recovery of the Polish-administered territories. Indeed, the program may not stop there. There are signs here and there in the Western German press and the pronouncements of politicians that the Germans will not be satisfied with the 1937 frontiers. For instance, Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, writing in the December issue of *Aussenpolitik*, Western Germany's equivalent of *Foreign Affairs*, of which Professor Wilhelm Grewe, Chancellor Adenauer's adviser on international affairs and special representative at the Berlin Conference, is an editor, outlines a "German and European Eastern program," to be realized within the framework of an American "roll-back" policy in Europe, the next phase of which, he says, will be aimed at the "restoration of a genuine balance between East and West." In the course of the article he maintains that a future German government would be well within its rights under international law to re-open with Czechoslovakia its re-occupation of the Sudeten region in 1945. Where all this will lead, no one can say, but having regard to the past, it seems safest to assume the worst. The present leaders of the Federal Republic may genuinely believe that the promotion of a reunification policy could be kept within the limits of peaceful action. But every lesson of history and of our own experience teaches that in matters of this kind there will, sooner or later, be a resort to force. It is well to remember that since the peace of Westphalia in 1648 finally set the seal on the disintegration of the old Reich, there have been nearly 20 wars in Central Europe arising out of the territorial disorganization of Germany and the territorial ambitions of Germany and her neighbors. Chancellor Adenauer has more than once said that the establishment of the EDC does not mean closing the door to reunification, but, on the contrary, that it provides the best means for reunifying Germany.

The American High Commissioner, Dr. James B. Conant, has recently echoed this view. It is difficult to see what it could mean unless it is contemplated that force, or diplomacy based upon the threat of force, is to be used at some stage to compel the Soviets to hand over the Eastern Zone—and perhaps other areas. But even if, in the future, the Western German government conducts its policy with circumspection and the fullest regard for its obligation to its European partners, there would still exist in the situation where Eastern and Western German troops faced each other across a frontier the danger that incidents, arising from tension between the pro- and anti-Communist factions, could not be isolated and might lead to general war.

An ancillary cause for concern over West German rearmament (within either the EDC or NATO frameworks) is the fact that, although the German voters decisively rejected the extremist parties in elections last autumn, there are now reports that, as plans and preparations for rearmament go forward in Western Germany, members of the militarist, industrialist and Nazi cliques are finding their way back into places of power and influence, while democratic-minded Germans — those who resisted the Nazis and many of whom were installed in posts of authority by the Allied governments— are being ousted or sidetracked on one pretext or another.

Is it really worth exposing ourselves to these risks for

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

The European Defense Community

What is it?—a treaty to provide France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg with a common army, defense budget and program for armament and resources utilization, under the direction of, in effect, a European government: a Commissariat (Cabinet), Council (Senate), Assembly and Court. The European Army would be placed at the disposal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Command.

How did it begin?—the idea of a common European Army was first advanced in 1950 by Winston Churchill; the French Government immediately took the initiative for negotiating the present treaty, signed in Paris, May 27, 1952.

Will it succeed?—to go into effect, the treaty must be approved by the parliaments of all six nations, of which Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and West Germany have completed ratification; France has not yet acted, and the Italian parliament, which has just begun debate on the treaty, is not expected to reach a decision for at least six months. Great Britain, which has declined to join the EDC, has lately shown a willingness to become more closely associated with it.

the sake of 12 German divisions? Although the SHAPE generals have assured us that a German contribution is vital to Western security, it is, with due respect to expert opinion, difficult to see how this could be. If the present British and American forces are to remain in Western Europe, then of course 12 German divisions must be counted an addition to strength. But whether they could make a vital difference to the power of the West to resist an invasion in force, where the aggressor was able to dispose of forces three or four times the size of those of the West, seems doubtful.

The main deterrent to Soviet aggression lies in another form of strength. The function of ground forces in Western Germany would appear to be limited to that of discouraging attempts from the East to assimilate the Western Zones of Germany by political and economic penetration, and perhaps by use of Eastern German forces, where in the absence of Western defense troops an ambiguous situation might develop. But if Allied forces are to remain on the continent for this purpose, Western German contingents seem superfluous. On the other hand, if Western German troops are eventually to *replace* Allied forces, as seems likely since neither the United States nor Britain is prepared to give categorical guarantees on this point, then there loom all the dangers of rearming a Western Germany which, without the counterpoise of American and British forces, would be in a position, as the strongest member of EDC, to dominate its partners.

It seems more sensible to leave things the way they are in Western Germany for the present. Objections may be raised as to the cost to the American taxpayer of maintaining these forces in Germany indefinitely. There is no reason why the Western Germans should not make an increased contribution toward the cost. They are well able to do so. They are now paying at the rate of 7.2 billion Deutsche Marks toward the support of Allied forces in Germany, whereas experts some time ago estimated that a fair German contribution toward Western defense should be substantially greater. Furthermore, if the Western Germans had to raise and equip their own forces, without outside aid, it would certainly cost them much more than DM 16 billion for many years to come. This arrangement would no doubt be unpopular with the Western Germans, who would not care about paying more for troops which are not their own, but after two disastrous world wars, we do not *owe* the Germans an army, and if maintenance of the peace requires that their protection be provided by Allied forces, the Germans should meet a fair share of the costs. Properly regarded, it is no detraction from its dignity or prestige that the German Federal Republic does not have armed forces of its own. Except for security matters, it has had the practical exercise of all the important attributes of national sovereignty for more than two years. This could now be made a *de jure* sovereignty by putting into

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effect all except the security provisions of the Bonn Conventions.

In the long run, of course, another solution for Germany must be found. At the Four Power Berlin Conference last February, neither the Western Foreign Ministers nor Molotov was prepared to propose or explore solutions which would meet the preoccupations of both sides and which might therefore have had some chance of leading to agreement. Mr. Molotov's European security plan, which, it appeared, would leave no one secure except the Soviet Union, was matched by the Western Ministers' invitation to Mr. Molotov to agree both to free elections in all of Germany and to the right of a reunited Germany to rearm and to ally herself with whom she pleases—a proposal which, in prevailing circumstances, amounts to asking the Soviet Union to agree to the installation of German, American and other Western defense forces on the Oder-Neisse line.

What alternative solutions might have been put forward? It might have been suggested that the stationing of Allied occupation troops should be continued for a definite period, say five years, at the end of which security arrangements and the future status of Allied troops in Germany would be reviewed. In the interval, the reunification of Germany, the formation of a freely elected German government, and the negotiation of the provisions of a peace treaty, except those dealing with security, might have produced conditions making it easier to resolve this problem. In a variant of this proposal, the occupation forces would be withdrawn from the central area of Germany—the Russian forces east of the Oder-Neisse rivers and the US, British and French troops west of the Rhine.

Another alternative which might have been canvassed is the admission of a Germany, reunited on the basis of free elections, to the United Nations and the establishment of a United Nations' defense force for Germany. Such a defense force could be composed as to one-third of contingents recruited from Germany, and as to the other two-thirds, in equal part of contingents of the present occupation powers (say, 100,000 German troops and British, French, American and Russian contingents of 50,000 each). The command of the force could be for a specified period and could devolve in turn upon a national of each of the countries participating, beginning, perhaps, with a Russian and concluding with a German commander. There would be an integrated international command staff. In time the contingents of other member countries of the United Nations might replace some or all of those supplied by the present occupation powers. Such a scheme would make it possible for Germany to be neutralized as a military force in Europe without leaving a vacuum. At the same time, it would enable the German people to play their rightful part in the protection of their independence and homeland. It would look to the day when the occupation powers could be relieved of the burden of maintaining troops in Germany. It would not disturb the present relationship of forces between the power blocs, but would provide a transition to a genuinely international solution of the problem of European security. Finally, it should strengthen the prestige and authority of the United Nations, no small desideratum in itself.

It is easy to find objections to this or any formula of which one might think, for any road to a settlement of the German problem will be beset with difficulties. But if the four powers have the will for a settlement, a solution will be found. The important thing is to keep the way open until the will exists. We cannot do better for the present than to stand where we are in our relations with Western Germany. This is no time for bold moves and "dynamic" policies, which can only have the effect of deepening the division between East and West, creating fresh causes of tension, and closing more of the avenues by which agreement might ultimately be reached. To be sure, the Soviets started the whole thing and were the first to re-establish armed German forces. But is the West compelled to make the same mistakes? Going the Soviets one better is not a policy; it is a one-way ticket to disaster. The Western powers must be strong, but they must also be wise—wise enough for themselves and, if necessary, for the Germans and Soviets as well.

The French Will Fight For the West—IF

by Frank Gorrell

WILL FRENCHMEN fight *with* Germans *against* Russians or Russia's allies? To anyone who knows France and the French, there is no doubt about the answer despite all the hemming and hawing on the question of the French National Assembly's ratification of the European Defense Community. The answer is simply, clearly, unmistakably that to prevent—or slow up—a Russian aggression against Western Europe the French *will* fight the Russians — with or without the Germans. On the basis of direct personal knowledge of France that goes back to student days some 35 years ago and includes residence in the country for the last five years, that is our answer. And we know no one—whether French or foreign resident, Communist, neutralist, pacifist or fanatical anti-German or anti-American—who doesn't really have the same answer.

Then what about the six-nation European Defense

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Community? Why is there so much trouble in getting the ratification by the French parliament of a system of European military security for which some Frenchmen were in the first place responsible? The best way to approach the answer is, we think, to quote a statement made by President Eisenhower at a recent White House press conference. He was asked about America's military intentions in Asia, whether US troops might after all be used to resist Communist aggression. His answer in the indirect form of quotation used in the official transcript was:

> The President thought the best answer he had heard in diplomacy was that given in France to Germany in late August or late July of 1914 when Germany asked her her intentions. She said: "France will do that which her best interests dictate."

Nearly 40 years later the French hesitation about the EDC is based upon a controversy about that which France's best interests dictate. But, except for the Communists (and not even for all of them), the quarrel is about means, not about ends. France is of the West. France will fight to remain of the West and to preserve a West of which to remain.

The goal of the Frenchman as an individual is to remain French. Only the Englishman can compare with the Frenchman in a kind of patriotism that considers the ancestral home and its accreted traditional values as the very essence of all values.

As a citizen, the typical Frenchman now believes that though Germany has been in the past the worst enemy of his country's survival and may again be such an enemy, the clear and present danger comes from Russia's possible ambitions and aggressions. And though the mechanized, standardized, de-individualized way of modern existence, which the Frenchman as an individual hates, fears and rejects, is often associated with the US, the French are fully aware that they risk losing infinitely more of their special quality of "Frenchness" from any variety of Sovietization or Communization.

The French will fight *with* the Germans against the Russians; but they will not fight *for* the Germans or even *for* the Americans. They will not fight either to make or to prevent the unification of the two Germanies; they will not fight to push the German frontiers beyond the Oder-Neisse line; they will not fight to "liberate" Europe as far as the Pripet Marshes.

THE KEY to French resistance to the EDC is that, especially since the opening of the age of the H-bomb, the arrangement of any military pattern on the ground in Europe or even in the air above Europe seems to be inseparably connected with political factors; with the balance of power within Europe as well as between West and East; and hence with the relative roles of Germany and France.

The French are in the unfortunate psychological situation of having both lost and won the Second World War. A recent remark made by Bertrand de Jouvenal about the Western Europeans in general applies most to them. In Europe, he said, "the determination to do is less obvious than the hope that others shall abstain from doing. Instead of making history, Europeans now fear history." Before the French can be expected to do—that is to acquire the *will* to make history—there has to be some change in the willingness, if not eagerness, of the Eisenhower Administration to treat the Germans as though they had won the Second World War.

THE TROUBLE with the EDC—as the non-Communists and anti-Communists in France see it—is that in its present form it tends to give Germany not only an army (which though European would certainly be German first) but also a chance to dominate and control the whole European politico-economic-military pattern (which might happen anyway, but not so quickly). By the EDC the French give and the Germans get.

When Premier Laniel and Defense Minister Pleven were manhandled at a ceremony in Paris honoring French sacrifices in Indo-China, the wild young men of the political far Right who kicked and slapped the top men of the government carried placards asking whether Marshal Juin would be replaced as chief military adviser to the government by General von Stulpnagel (who commanded the German occupying forces during the last war). But they weren't anti-German as much as pro-French—and pro-fighting French. They were nationalists — royalists, Gaullists, neo-Fascists — who are even more anti-EDC than the Communists and neutralists. But they oppose a German army only because the flower of the French *cadres*—the officers and noncoms—are pinned down, killed or maimed in Asia instead of being used as the elements of a French army in Europe able to stand up to the Germans.

In objecting to the EDC in its present form, Marshal Juin isn't—and has never been—opposed to West German rearmament. He deliberately invited the drastic sanctions against him because Laniel and Pleven had again and again refused to pay any attention to the criticisms of the EDC which, because of his position, it was his right and duty to make—and to be heard. His *solutions de réchange*—alternatives—are either a revised EDC assuring French military strength and independence; or the entry of West German forces into the NATO—in which event the Germans get but the French wouldn't give. Except for those offered by the Communists and by tiny minorities of diehards, most alternatives to the present EDC are based upon the future fact of the French fighting the Russians or Russia's allies—but on a footing of both practical and moral equality with the Germans.

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Most of the 59 Socialists (out of a total of 104 members of the National Assembly) who recently declared themselves opposed to the present EDC want the military structure to be fitted into a larger political structure, with a European executive council in control, and the British closely linked with it. The Weygand solution—one of a half dozen others—calls for German units in the NATO, but depending on the NATO headquarters, with a political pattern to be developed later on.

There is no doubt that the chances for ratification of the EDC in Paris reached a new low after the Conant and Dulles speeches and the uproar about the H-bomb experiments. The French reaction to the curt rejection by Washington of the latest Molotov feelers was many times more angry than the British. And the *London Observer* said: "The American Administration is showing a growing tendency to create accomplished facts by unilateral decisions and declarations—a tendency naturally echoed over here by the call for greater independence. We are tending to drift apart, and that way lies disaster." And the *London Times* was certainly speaking for the French when it wrote that: "However absurd the Molotov suggestion seems at first hearing, it deserves investigation — and testing — and, if it still seems absurd at second hearing, it must be given a reasoned refutation to the satisfaction of all the anxious people listening to the great debate on peace and war—and bombs."

And bombs! The French are by tradition and in fact—even now!—a military people. Their volunteers in Korea and Indo-China are splendid fighters, both tough and intelligent. An army of French volunteers in Europe would make wonderful fighting material. But what about the relation between the little wars and the big wars? A couple of the newest H-bombs (or maybe one) could wipe out most of France (whereas it might take all of a couple of dozen to wipe out most of the US). If such weapons are to be used in Europe, the discussion about the EDC becomes merely literary, the French feel.

Whether or not Dien Bien Phu holds out, it remains true that its French defenders, fighting what may be politically not only a hopeless but a useless war, and aware that they were being figuratively stabbed in the back by indifference at home, did pretty well. Perhaps in compensation, the US military authorities agreed that beginning on April 3 the French, rather than the US flag, would fly over US installations in France. Or perhaps it was Spanish Generalissimo Franco who indirectly won this victory for French pride.

In any event, the pride does exist. And so do the ability and the will to fight. But to mobilize them, the French will have to be called upon to fight with, rather than for the Germans; and for clearly discernible "best interests" of their country; and the less those interests are dictated from across the Atlantic the more likely are they to be directed toward the Steppes.

A European Union Is Still Our Best Hope

by James King

THERE IS A positive side to the European Defense Community that goes beyond reducing the possibility of renewed "fratricidal strife" of Frenchman and German. European union, even the first modest steps implicit in the Schumann Plan and the EDC, will give rise to a new power center in the world. It will have a population exceeding that of the United States, with industrial capacity comparable to that of the Soviet empire in most strategic materials and vastly superior in consumer goods production, and with scientific and technical skills unsurpassed by the Soviet Union or even by the United States. If not paralyzed by continuing internal weakness, "Little" Europe will find itself a major power astride the high road of history, no longer a congeries of minor powers lost each in its peculiar dead end. With that realization should come renewed confidence and vigor. What the American and French revolutions, and more recently the Russian, meant for the world in terms of readjustments of power relationships may well be repeated—without the long delay that followed the first, nor, it is hoped, the violence that accompanied the others.

This is what the Americans who labored to help the EDC idea get under way had in the background of their minds. Where else but in the possibility—remote by all current estimates—of an internal Soviet collapse, is there any hope of relieving the present situation wherein two great powers face each other across the conference table and battlefield, neither powerful enough to face the other down, both capable of plunging the world into nuclear war. Given the chance, and the favorable omens, Europe alone can face the Soviet threat, can accumulate sufficient material resources and, what is more important, sufficient courage and morale to stand alone against the Bear. Surely such a Europe, allied with the US and Britain, would reduce the Soviet "threat."

The vision of European union is what ought to be debated in Europe, the risk and requirements on our side is what ought to be debated here. They have let themselves be blinded by history, and by the limited interests of special groups from politicians to industrialists, into timidly refusing to take the risks inherent in the EDC. We on our part have been so blinded by our fear of Communism that we have not asked ourselves what the real meaning of EDC is. Many Ameri-

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cans have literally not looked beyond the "12 German divisions." Others have advanced as far as the possibility that we may bring our troops home and thus ease our tax burdens, but no further.

Is there a practical alternative to EDC? British-American postwar continental policy has been built on France, despite what is said in some quarters about our building up Germany. But France has proved no tower of strength, particularly where union is concerned. Should we now abandon France and place our dependence on the Germans because Adenauer is a success and because the furnaces of the Ruhr are flaming?

Any alternative to EDC must satisfy several requirements. First, of course, it must be acceptable to the United States. This is undisputed in Europe inside the lunatic fringe. It means that the alternative must strengthen the Free World against Russia; it means also that the methods chosen must not offend very many Americans, particularly those who are members of Congress. This requirement galls many Europeans.

The second requirement is that the alternative must be acceptable to France, that is, unless we are to change our policy of some years standing and write the French off as an almost total loss. The threat of France going Communist is no longer so terrifying as it was in the dark weeks of 1948, now that the German Federal Republic has come into being as an anti-Communist buffer to the East. But French contribution to the strength of Western Europe, while disappointing, is not negligible. Moreover supply lines to our token force in Germany pass through France. And France is in all things save politics a fortunate country. Her soil is rich, her climate friendly, her resources considerable, her industry diversified, her people energetic and ingenious. If writing the French off meant delivering her into the hands of those who might mobilize her resources for the opposing side it would be a sorry bargain for us indeed.

A third requirement for the alternative to EDC is that it must be acceptable to Germany. Being acceptable to Germany is not a simple requirement. EDC has been sold to the Germans by dint of much effort and determination, but also, given the times and the circumstances, they were able to grow up with it. Their most substantial objection to EDC, when the idea was broached, was that it required them to rearm. Now they are no longer so loath to take up arms, but what alternative is there that would offer them a substitute justification for rearming that did not reek of "lost" German glory? What alternative, in short, that would not reconcile the satellites to their Soviet slavemasters and strike terror in the hearts of other Europeans? German agreement to rearm *within* EDC is the soundest achievement of postwar diplomacy in Europe. It is also the rock on which European Union might be built.

There are other requirements for an acceptable alternative to EDC, but these three will suffice to exhibit the dimensions of the problem of finding one. It perhaps should be added that acceptability to Russia is *not* a requirement. French parliamentary timidity, and even sometimes the peculiar reactions of our British allies, may give the impression that Soviet response is a prime consideration. This is not the case; no conceivable alternative that would satisfy the Russians could possibly satisfy the United States or the German Federal Republic. And, because we do not *know* what the Russians will do does not mean that we should do nothing. Every important move we have made in Western Europe since 1948 has been an "affront" to Soviet Russia and any one of the more decisive ones might have precipitated war. But none of them were really decisive in that sense. Soviet reasons for not going to war may well lie quite outside the European arena. Moreover, it is doubtful if they themselves could say what would be the last straw. We *do* know that they are stimulated by weakness and deterred by strength, or even an appearance of strength. That is all we have to go on. We have taken the risk before. We must take the risk again.

ONLY three alternatives to EDC have been put forward seriously. The first, in various forms, is that the present occupation of Germany should be continued. This is decidedly acceptable to the French, who in their weaker moments would like nothing better. It is equally unacceptable to us and to the Germans. For us it would mean an indefinite commitment to maintain an army in Europe. But that is not the only reason, nor the most important one. For this alternative invites us to sacrifice all our accomplishments in Western Germany, to tear down the bulwark we have built there, discredit Adenauer, and deliberately undermine German democracy and Germany's alignment with the West. Adenauer's strength, and the vitality of the political system with which he is associated, rests upon success—success in relieving the hardships that resulted from the war, success in easing the burdens and restrictions of occupation, and success in restoring the Germans to a position of respectability and trust in the world. Thus a salient feature of Allied occupation has been progressive release. We could not now reverse that process, or disavow its continuance, and expect to see Adenauer retain the confidence of his people. More than this, it is not only Adenauer's political future that is at stake, it is also the fate of the new German Federal Republic. The same forces that would rise against the present government in Germany would rise against the German constitution itself. In how short a time Western Germany would be reduced to impotence, or, worse, converted from an asset to a liability in the East-West balance, may not be predictable, but it would probably occur before the Soviet Empire falls of its own weight. The risk is too great for us to contemplate. Likewise, and for the same reasons looked at from their point of view, it is too great a risk for the Germans to endure, quite aside from their simple distaste for continued occupation.

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Any proposal that entails continued Russian presence on German soil shares these objections. Wrapping the alleged alternative in the mantle of the United Nations, for example, does not take the curse off it.

The second proposed alternative is German membership in NATO—a proposal that was raised first in 1950 and then subsided when the United States Government threw its support behind EDC. It is probably unacceptable to the French, only less so to the other continental countries. It would be acceptable to the Germans, and might be accomplished so that the ghost of Prussian militarism, which Adenauer so much fears, would be laid. It is the agonizing alternative to which Secretary Dulles referred not so long ago. It would entail, at the minimum, a complete and painful reconstruction of US policy in Western Europe, because that policy could no longer be built around France. At the same time it would require extraordinary effort to keep France from being completely demoralized and perhaps lost to the West altogether. This might be done by developing the North Atlantic "community" implicit in NATO, but one can imagine what a storm any substantial proposals of that nature would raise on Capitol Hill. The same Senators who most hector the French for their intransigent reluctance to surrender a parcel of their sovereignty to EDC would reach for the Bricker amendment at the first suggestion that the US should do so to NATO.

One more alternative needs to be mentioned. In one form it was most recently proposed by Mr. Molotov at Berlin. Originally it was put forward, to his sorrow presumably, by Mr. Byrnes, then Secretary of State. This is the "forty-year treaty" to neutralize Germany. It is, again, decidedly acceptable to the French, who would accept anything that pledged the United States both to keep the Germans unarmed and to protect France from the Soviets. It is not acceptable to most hard-headed Europeans, including a minority of Frenchmen, who cannot conceive that an unarmed neutral Germany would long remain either unarmed or neutral. We have rejected it in recent years because it is an anachronism, left behind by the march of events (if indeed it ever was justified). It would surrender US assets in Central Europe even more surely than would a continuation of the occupation. Nor is there any real hope that the Russians would play ball. Any "treaty" to which they would agree would most certainly leave the Eastern territories in Polish hands and the Eastern Zone of Germany under Soviet domination. For these reasons alone the treaty would be unacceptable to Germans, who have already voted for the West and disunion against the seductive promise of reunification under Soviet aegis.

Other alternatives to EDC there may be. Certainly there is no closed season on speculation. But the times are pressing, and foreign offices cannot afford much imaginative play. The irreducible minima of the situation—those that drive every consideration to EDC or to NATO—are these: First, the United States, given its commanding position in the West and its sense of global insecurity, demands that German legions be added to the forces of freedom. Second, the Russians will not surrender anything they now have except in return for more. They will not give up their Zone of Germany except in return for a good chance to acquire all of Germany in exchange. Third, the French, though their fears are genuine, can be maneuvered (while we and the Russians cannot). Any speculation that ignores the first two of these points can have only esthetic attraction, if that. And the third point must be the key to a solution, however uncomfortable.

WE RETURN, then, to NATO and the EDC. Of these the latter is by all odds the more attractive. It means a revolution, but not a convulsion, in Western Europe. At the worst it will give German vigor a safe arena in which to express itself, and enable the West to realize the military potential that lies in Germany without exposing German democracy to what it most fears, the revival of militarism. At best it could be a long step towards the creation of "Europe," a new nation and a major power among nations.

NATO, the alternative, is more difficult, more risky, less promising. It would be otherwise if the United States, Britain and Canada were ready for limited federation. But nationalism, on the wane in Europe, is undiminished in other parts of the North Atlantic "community," and particularly in the United States where it has recently attained new heights. (Nationalism is not to be confused with isolationism, nor is American "internationalism" the enemy of nationalism.) But, given the existing circumstances, an invitation to Germany to join NATO as a full partner, with no more safeguards than NATO currently affords, or that might be wrung from a reluctant US Senate, would certainly have to be accompanied by a complete new approach to France—a France disinherited, disgruntled, resentful, and possibly convulsed. But France must accept a rehabilitated — and rearmed—Germany, if not in the EDC, then in NATO. History cannot be denied; trying to stand still only means that all our postwar gains in Germany are jeopardized. The Germans are probably no more dangerous than other peoples, no more diabolic nor beset by evil genius. But their terrible energies will be used, if not in constructive channels, then in destruction. Even if their destruction turns inwards upon themselves, as may well be the case, Europe would be the loser.

Moreover—let us be candid—the United Staates is in no mood to risk the loss of Germany. The real issue is not whether Germany will be rearmed and restored to its position among the powers, but whether the opportunity for Europe's rebirth will pass.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

English Painting In The Fifties

by Stephen Spender

THE PRESENT STATE of English painting is comparable to that of contemporary English poetry. In both arts, the middle-aged practitioners continue to hold the advantage of doing work that is "new," according to the vocabulary of modernism. Graham Sutherland and Francis Bacon (like Henry Moore in his sculpture and drawings) hold positions in painting, parallel to that of W. H. Auden in poetry. One looks to them for new developments in every stage of their art and their age seems only to have added power to their perpetual youth.

At the same time, there is a suspicion that perhaps we are misled through a confusion of vocabulary into expecting novelty of the young. Simply because, since about 1870, the young artist in Europe has always produced the new and the unexpected, we tend to identify innovations with youth, and feel that when they are lacking the young are without talent, or are prematurely aged and exhausted. But today the young start producing work which we expect from the old.

Recently, at the Royal College of Art in London, I inquired why the students give little support to an organization called the ICA (Institute of Contemporary Arts), which supports exhibitions and discussions about "advanced" art. The answer was that they were not interested in *avant garde*, movements which they regarded as old-fashioned. And the puzzling truth is that the young regard as new just that kind of realism which an older generation regard as dated. To judge from recent exhibitions of student work several students who have been to Italy have come back with canvasses of workers with thick wrists and fingers like carrots, sitting at the tables of grimy restaurants and eating vermicelli.

Yet despite a few examples of a rather crude realism, to suggest that there is just a reaction towards the Zolasque would be an over-simplification. The painter who above all dominates their imagination is Francis Bacon. Bacon's technical innovations are highly individualistic. He paints on the unprimed side of his canvases with the greatest directness and attack; and if a painting strikes him at any stage as "overworked" he destroys it. His paintings of hysterical faces fixed in what looks like a moment of seizure, and imprisoned behind lines suggesting bars, holds the young through the sheer force of their comment on the age of the hydrogen bomb, rather than by being "new" as surrealism was new. His contemporaries are hypnotized by Bacon's sense of living in this time. They do not think of him as making a revolution in his art. In any case, painters are hypnotized by the vision of their more magnetic contemporaries to a degree which always rather amazes me. If Picasso paints leeks, the other painters don't paint carrots, but leeks and only leeks in exactly Picasso's way; and several young English painters now enclose their images in rectangles painted in white lines, suggesting a glass case or prison bars, in exactly the way that Bacon does.

So there is not, on the whole, a direct return to realism, but an attempt to relate a great many things which seem a far cry from realism back to observed facts. A recent exhibition labelled "realist painting" contained many abstract and fantastic works which seemed a far cry from any direct form of realism. Yet one can see the point of young artists, who have developed along the lines of modern painting, feeling that they are arriving at so many dead ends, and trying to find their way back to the realistic image. If they can do this without abandoning what they have discovered in impressionism, post-impressionism, surrealism, etc., their work is likely to be more interesting than that of the social realists.

The young painters, like the young poets, are in search of a touchstone which will at once relate them to the problems of their art and to the realities of their time. They respect their elders and to some extent follow them, but find that their work started off with a confident relation to another time: to the ideological passion of the 1930s, to the apocalyptic violence of the war, or to a religious revival which also had its aesthetic roots in the thirties and forties. No young poet or painter of the fifties has the same confident and contemporary relation to the fifties as Auden and Sutherland had to the thirties, Dylan Thomas and Francis Bacon to the forties.

One reason why young artists seem today so uncertain which of several roads of modern art to take is that the private patron has disappeared. This means that the artist has to look more and more to the taste of members of committees and organizations like the Arts Council who will choose his work. Committee taste is official taste and when officials are "modern" in their outlook modernism itself tends to look academic. Today, the moment the work of an individual is collected, he becomes collective. And aside from total neglect, everything that is looked at becomes respectable.

Meanwhile the older artists are to some extent exploring the same problems as the younger ones. Their successes and failures at least show what appear to be fertile or infertile veins of development.

Shortly before the war, there was a very influential group of painters called the "Euston Road Group," led by William Coldstream, Graham Bell and Victor Pasmore. The name was derived from the road where was situated their joint studio and art school. All these painters used a French impressionistic technique to portray people, landscapes, objects. They reacted against surrealism, abstraction, fantastic and poetic painting.

Yet in spite of their return to reality which seems so parallel to what is going on now, the Euston Road school led to nothing. Coldstream, highly respected, has evolved into an academic figure. He is head of the Slade School of Art. Graham Bell, perhaps the most vital member of the group, was killed in the war. Lawrence Gowing, also a very talented painter, has taken to teaching and writing. Victor Pasmore has renounced impressionism and been through nearly all the modernist movements which the Euston Road Group renounced.

The poetic painters whose early work was perhaps a reaction from Coldstream and his group—Sutherland, Piper, John Craxton, Keith Vaughan and John Min-

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ton—have survived better, perhaps for two reasons. The first reason may well be that they are really poetic in the sense of being deeply interested in poetry. It is their strength and their weakness that they are "literary." Their weakness because I doubt whether the greatest achievements in imaginative painting can be made by painters who are largely concerned with trying to visualize and paint either what is a poetic image, or the kind of objects and scenes which are the subject matter of poetry (Piper's churchyards, mossy stones, remote mountains and lakes, et cetera). But it is also their strength because even if it does not lead to the greatest work, much good English painting has had connections with poetry: Blake, Palmer, the pre-Raphaelites in their earliest lyrical phase, for example.

The second reason why these poetic painters still have such a strong position is that, in spite of their being more "modern" and therefore seeming more obviously a "movement" committed to go in a certain direction, than the Euston Road Group, they have shown much more variety and flexibility. In the work of a painter like Sutherland, a pendulum seems always to be swinging between his dreamlike imagination and his researches into the real appearance of objects. When in doubt or in search of renewed inspiration, he turns back to objects. Most of his paintings are indeed variations on a theme, or stages of metamorphosis, in which a real object—a tree trunk, a country lane, a Welsh hillside, the crucifixion, Lord Beaverbrook or Mr. Maugham—are in process of turning from real objects into obsessive dream symbols.

The English appear to have great poetic imagination in literature, but easily exhausted poetic imagination in painting. Why this is so cannot be discussed here, but it remains fairly true that it is fatal for the English artist to become over-attached to the visualized poetic pattern. Two examples of this danger are the work of Ben Nicholson, an excellent painter, who has not been able to get out of the rut of his simple yet poetic abstract forms (mostly squares and circles), and that of John Piper who, after having been stuck in abstractionism (before the war), was knocked off it by the fires and bombings and became one of the best war painters; after which he contrasted scenes of fire and bomb-damage, with the passionate quietness of his paintings of houses, churches, gravestones. But now Piper runs the danger of fixing his country scenes into rigid patterns which really conceal a return to his pre-war dry abstractions. Piper is a clear example of a painter who needs to drink at the fountain of real experience of nature, if he is not to lapse into a very parched abstractionism.

As with contemporary English poetry, it would be easy to generalize about painting by drawing attention to the dearth of outstanding major talents. Only Francis Bacon, with his vital, energetic and decisive depictions of faces which seem caught in the flash of an instantaneous exposure, and Graham Sutherland are today outstanding. Lucian Freud, an extraordinary painter and figure, belongs more to a German than an English tradition. But as with poetry, if one is dissatisfied with a facile generalization, one goes on to become deeply interested in contemporary English painting. Some of the painters who can least easily be classified, are among the most interesting. There is, for instance, Keith Vaughan, who has developed the least explored side of Cézanne—his manner of painting nudes—and whose landscapes are very satisfying. There are the very rare and intensely concentrated water colors of David Jones, a Catholic mystic who will, in his books and paintings, probably interest posterity far more than he attracts attention today.

During the present century, both in painting and poetry, a demand has been created for perpetual experiment and innovation. As was perhaps inevitable, the time has come when the most serious work can no longer satisfy this demand—with the inevitable result that there is a sense of disappointment. There is even a danger that this disappointment affects the artists themselves. They may know that to work seriously they cannot go on in directions already explored; they have to look around them at things, and go back to earlier stages of modern painting. But they may find it as disconcerting to do so, as we do to see them grouped as "realists" and the like. On the whole, "realism" seems to be the most vigorous of the various movements in English, as in French, painting. It is beginning to attach to itself critics like John Berger of the *New Statesman,* who may strike one as reactionary in their romantic feeling for "social realism" and yet seem to be discussing the things that most preoccupy the young painters.

Mr. Republican

As is universally true of human beings Robert A. Taft was a child of his environment. Richly endowed mentally he developed his intellect in public and private schools, at Harvard and at Yale until he had one of the keenest minds ever devoted to public service in the United States. His social philosophy was by no means shaped by his schooling.

The Taft Story, by William S. White (Harper; $3.50).

By and large it was determined by family and other connections with the socially, intellectually, and economically elite of Cincinnati. Contributing to his conservative outlook was a quarter of a century of the practice of corporation law. His happy marriage to a congenial, talented, conservative woman was in perfect harmony with these other forces shaping his view of public affairs. So was his long and intimate association with Herbert Hoover, begun when he served as counsel for the Food Administration during World War I. Did Senator Taft realize that he was betraying *noblesse oblige* when he explained to interviewer Stephen K. Bailey, "But I have been interested in social problems. I have always been active in charity work in Cincinnati"? Robert Taft had never experienced personally the misery of depression victims and apparently never sensed the narrow economic margin on which millions of his fellow countrymen live. Apparently he never understood Franklin Roosevelt's sensitiveness to these facts. In the Senate his voting record was almost uniformly against New Deal and Fair Deal legislation.

Yet whoever applied to Robert Taft the couplet, "Come weal, come woe, I'm status quo" grossly misjudged the Senator. His profound respect for facts induced him to keep his social philosophy fluid enough that Stephen Bailey, who had observed Taft at close range wrote in 1949 that "not before his death will anyone be able to speak with complete authority about the 'education' of Robert A. Taft." As time passed and Taft's name became attached to a federal housing bill and a measure to provide federal aid for education stories began to circulate about old gentlemen in their clubs who grumbled "Taft is becoming a damn Socialist."

"Education is socialistic anyhow and

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has been for a hundred and fifty years," explained the Senator with respect to his federal aid bill. Perhaps about the best tribute Taft ever received was paid inadvertently by the national head of the real estate interest when he charged Taft with the sin of Communism.

When, in 1946, President Truman impetuously asked Congress to empower him to draft the striking railroad workers and the House promptly and overwhelmingly voted him the power it was the minority leader of the Senate Taft who rose "to stop this nonsense" as he had privately expressed it. "Strikes," he said, "cannot be prohibited, without interfering with the basic freedom essential to our form of government." The Taft-Hartley Act did later halt though it did not "prohibit" strikes.

Taft possessed a superb intellect which he utilized efficiently as a legislator. He could master any intricate detail of pertinent information concerning a pending bill. It must have been an unprecedented spectacle when, in the Seventy-ninth Congress, he stood up as minority floor leader with the majority questioning and depending upon him for information on one of their own measures. Because of his extraordinary keenness he was sometimes impatient with the slower witted and would blurt out, even to an admirer, "That's stupid." Nor was this confined to lesser folk. When conservative David Lawrence, no enemy of Taft, published what the Senator considered a misstatement of fact about the pending Taft-Hartley bill he declared from the floor that Lawrence had written a "puerile article." Nor did such things turn admirers against him. "Rarely," says William S. White, in his just published *The Taft Story,* "has a man been forgiven so much by so many."

Senator Taft's friends found him always unpredictable and at times quite erratic. He would go out of his way to say things that, however proper, provoked unnecessary controversy. Such for example, was his public statement that he would oppose dismissal of a Communist teacher unless he was teaching Communism.

In Cleveland, at a soil conservation farm meeting, he said, he was "tired of seeing all these people riding around in Cadillacs." Incidentally he usually drove a Plymouth. And at Kenyon College his denouncing the war guilt trials as based on *ex-post-facto* law was a frank legal opinion no one else in public life then dared to state. He resembled somewhat Winston Churchill whose fellow conservatives never could tell until a campaign was over what *faux pas* he might make such, for example, as his Gestapo speech in the 1945 campaign smearing the Labor Party with a charge that contributed to the ensuing crushing Conservative defeat. Taft's contemptuous comment on "Whistle Stop" speeches was turned against him by President Truman who gloried in the "Whistle Stop" and won re-election with it in 1948. Two years later Taft probably made more speeches than any previous Ohio senatorial candidate, all without a single unfortunate slip.

Robert Taft was one of that indispensible class of citizens who become expert in the art of practical politics. Properly enough he started political canvassing by ringing door bells on the precinct level. So, step by step, he became for a decade a member of the Ohio Senate and then of the Senate of the United States. Here through aptitude, experience, diligence, and intelligence he rose to the high eminence that made him, in due time, probably *the* Senator. In his rise he became an inveterate organization Republican intolerant of mugwumpism. By the time the Republicans had captured control of the Eightieth Congress, he had mastered the art of legislation.

Doubtless he considered the Taft-Hartley law his masterpiece. "It seems to me," said Taft during the debate on the bill, "that our aim should be to reach the point where, when an employer meets employees, they have substantially equal bargaining power so that neither side feels it can make an unreasonable demand and get away with it." White informs us that "Taft, though this was not so well known, had fought off reactionary extremists on this issue almost as fiercely as he had fought off liberal Democrats!"

In the event, Labor's strategy with respect to the Taft-Hartley Act proved futile. Even pro-labor Senator Morse denounced Labor representatives bitterly for persistently refusing to suggest positive legislative approaches to the pending measure. The "slave labor law" slogan certainly backfired. During Senator Taft's 1950 campaign for re-election Labor spared no effort in exploiting the Taft-Hartley Act trying to defeat him. He could be pardoned for feeling that he had been vindicated when he carried 87 of Ohio's 88 counties though many of them are highly industrialized and obtained the thumping majority of 430,000 over his opponent.

But it cannot be denied that Taft never to the end of his life grasped the fact that American society had become intensely dynamic and that a social revolution had been consummated. Radical change had taken place, he knew well enough, but he attributed it to the folly of what he conceived to be irresponsible demagogues such as Roosevelt and Truman. He could not admit a single virtue in the New Deal and the Fair Deal and "creeping socialism" became an obsession. One could only wonder what he would say if he could see the present administration's recent reversal of policies in deference to the same irresistible social forces that dictated New Deal policies.

Taft appears not to have comprehended the real nature of the two-party system, how it is the resultant of forces in American society influenced by gifted leaders. The successful Presidents have not been men with hard and fast social philosophies and White doubts whether Taft would have distinguished himself as President as he did in the Senate. White might have pointed out that the Senate is no training school for Presidents. In the last century Presidents Pierce, Buchanan, Johnson, Benjamin Harrison, and Truman had formerly been Senators and of these Truman may rank highest when history has rendered its verdict.

The closing months of Taft's career were his finest. With a magnanimity worthy of a Lincoln he set out to make the Eisenhower Administration workable. Here he proved indispensable particularly with a President who was not only inexperienced politically but who apparently held a view of the Presidency that required a co-ordinating leadership in Congress. This leadership Taft provided. "In effect," wrote Walter Lippmann, "Senator Taft came as near as is possible under our form of government to acting as the President's prime minister." What the first half year of the Eisenhower Administration would have been like without Taft we cannot know but a degree of orderliness did come to pass for which Taft was very largely responsible. Even as he lay on what

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proved to be his death bed he clutched General Wedemeyer's arm and said, "I've got to snap out of this. Eisenhower needs me."

The passing of "Mr. Republican" left a vacuum in the party and in the Administration that has not yet been filled. While he lived no such party disintegration and uproar as prevails today existed. What might he have done to restrain Senator McCarthy? The blessing once passed upon him and his ways by Taft is simply inexplicable, but in the matter of Eisenhower's nomination of Bohlen as ambassador to Russia Taft contemptuously rejected both McCarthy's proposal that Dulles be placed under oath and that Bohlen submit to a "lie detector" test.

As Ernest K. Lindley put it at the time of the Senator's death, "Taft was not only a great spokesman, indeed one of the authors of Republicanism, but an important centripetal force in the party." No higher tribute to the departed leader can now be paid than to say that he only, had he lived, might have been able to prevent the current party debacle. Since his departure centrifugal party forces have been released with the consequence that the resulting confusion in the party and in the Administration are matters of deep concern to responsible Americans regardless of party and indeed to a free world in crisis. ROBERT WHITE

The Dollar Balance

IN TWO WORLD WARS, England depleted her economic resources, exhausted the foreign assets upon which she had depended in her economic maturity and transformed herself from a creditor into a client of the United States. It is evident that neither the United States nor England has adjusted to this striking change in the world economy. The most enlightened of American opinion has tended to see the problem as one of expanding trade between the two countries and the very cautious program recommended by President Eisenhower on the basis of the Randall Commission Report takes this "trade, not aid" position. Other elements of the position include free convertibility of currencies, and the abolition of all manner of restrictions currently clogging the channels of the trade of nations.

There is not the slightest doubt that increased trade is a good thing and the lowering of trade barriers a necessary step toward its achievement. Is it enough? If the United States were to remove all of its tariffs tomorrow, would England next month, next year, even next decade achieve recovery and economic advance? Would the political tensions between us diminish when the natural resentment between debtor and creditor had disappeared? It would be very good indeed if we could answer "yes" to these questions. But there is more wrong with England and with Western Europe than the height of American trade barriers and the instability of the American economy.

The Dollar, by R. H. Harrod (Harcourt, Brace; $3.50).

The central problem is one of productivity. Before World War II a very considerable gap between American and English productivity was just bearable because England could draw upon the very substantial foreign assets which she had acquired during her years of economic dominion. Since that war, the assets have dwindled and the productivity gap has widened, despite the very best efforts of England to re-equip its industry. England, and indeed Europe in general, does not produce enough goods desired with sufficient intensity by Americans to earn England the dollars with which to buy the American goods her factories require and her people crave. Little evidence suggests that she will soon do so. Since the war, the United States and England have alike postponed a real attack upon their problems by the device of economic aid, first the British loan, next Marshall Plan assistance, and now Mutual Security programs. Undeniably, however, continuing charity by one nation to another infuriates giver and recipient alike. It is surely not the basis of free alliance.

What then is the prospect? The coldest of economic analyses identifies three choices. Britain could reconcile herself to a lowered standard of life which required smaller imports of foreign goods and permitted the production of a larger percentage of domestic requirements at home. Or, recognizing that too many people crowd an area too small in size and too poor in resources to produce efficiently, England might encourage the shift of a substantial portion of her population to areas where land is plentiful and labor scarce. Englishmen who emigrated, like Englishmen who remained, would enjoy a higher standard of life. More recently a happier alternative has caught the imaginations of many: the prospect of a United Europe, one large free trading area, rich in skills and moderately rich in raw materials, and able to achieve the same economic advantages for its inhabitants as more fortunate Americans now enjoy.

How does Mr. Harrod, one of England's leading economists, view the future? Is the outlook as grim as has been suggested? He emphasizes aspects of England's troubles less critical of Englishmen and offers remedies less disruptive to English arrangements. He agrees that even in the absence of American tariffs Great Britain could not hope to achieve direct dollar balance with the United States and could anticipate over-all balance only by sales to dollar-earning third countries, particularly in Latin America. In the postwar world, England, in Mr. Harrod's view, could rectify her balance of trade either by selling more commonwealth-mined gold to the United States, devaluing her currency, invading new markets, or discriminating against imports

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

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from dollar countries. But, in the real world, these theoretical alternatives encountered practical limitations arising partly from American policy and partly from British error. United States policy has discouraged gold production by failing to increase the price of gold in line with increases in other American prices. Britain's devaluation of currency was much too large because it helped to turn the terms of trade against her without increasing significantly her sales to the United States. Britain's effort to invade world markets met little success because she invaded them too late. Instead of starting her drive right after the war, she spent precious years re-equipping her industry, years used by American merchants to establish themselves firmly in South American markets. In effect then, England must discriminate against American goods if she is ever to acquire the resources which will make possible free convertibility of her currency.

And so Mr. Harrod's polite and elegant analysis ultimately lays Britain's plight at America's door. The United States should raise the price of gold, amend the International Monetary Fund to permit experimental devaluation of currency, lower tariffs, and permit discrimination against its own goods without complaint.

It must be added that Mr. Harrod has an optimism about English prospects and a concept of American responsibilities which are hard to share. Although Mr. Harrod does not say so, raising the price of gold increases American dollar subsidies to the English commonwealth and quite possibly to Russia, a major gold producer, as well. Nor is it easy to see how England could have retained any markets she secured after the war, if she had not re-equipped her industry, and it is the point of Mr. Harrod's argument that England was too poor to re-equip her industry extensively and increase her exports substantially at the same time. But concentration on exports would have been no long run answer. Mr. Harrod blames some of England's difficulties on American economic instability and, certainly, it is in our own interest as well to iron out cyclical fluctuations in employment and income. Surely, however, the fact that the British economy is extraordinarily vulnerable to American business cycles is less a criticism of the United States than it is a symptom of British economic weakness.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

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THEATRE

THEATRE, I suppose, is the most strongly and directly erotic of the arts. Here you do not merely have passionate sounds as in music and passionate images as in painting; from your seat in the orchestra you can fall in love with an actual actress. And so kings have gone round to dressing rooms to find their mistresses, and Dr. Johnsons have had to stop going there because their "amorous propensities" were inflamed by "white bosoms and silk stockings." Even on celluloid Rudolph Valentino could enamor millions, and Mary Pickford becomes "America's sweetheart."

The case of Valentino is simple: he was attractive in the most immediate way. With him belong all the young persons of both sexes whose physical charms people will pay money to see. I do not think he would ever have been called America's lover. The land of the pilgrims' pride could not permit itself a lover. What's needed is a "sweetheart" whom you can take home to mother. Miss Pickford was not the object of love but a symbol of what ought to be loved. And, as the movies have come more and more under the domination of ideology (chiefly Catholic), the Valentinos and Jean Harlows have given way to homey and wholesome types.

The erotic relation as between audience and actor does not gain nobility when it loses directness. Movie stars are a miserable *ersatz* for folk heroes and saints. It is too bad when actors mirror the poverty of our spiritual life rather than reduce it. I am thinking of actors with talent. Shirley Booth, for example, is an actress of diabolical accuracy within her rather narrow range. She can carry her body as such people carry their bodies, look over her shoulder as such people look over their shoulders, speak —in pronunciation, speech melody, emphasis—as such people talk—such people, that is, as she herself is (at least in her public personality which is all I know). This ability, along with the gift of projection, makes her a stage personality and, for some parts, or perhaps just one part, the right actress. What could be more satisfactory on occasions when a playwright has re-written her one part? But her current appearance in New York is something else. *By the Beautiful Sea* is a banal musical comedy made interesting by Miss Booth's personality. It works. That is to say, I did find it interesting to sit at the side with one eye on Miss Booth and the other on her lover, the public. These days it is the woman who makes the advances, and the man who responds—in proportion as he finds in the woman, not a goddess, not even a female, but himself. Someone has said Miss Booth, is the symbol of democracy. If democracy means that the common man is delighted with the common man, this is true.

It is unfair to pick on Miss Booth. Danny Kaye is a more glaring example. Making love in public has been done before. Mr. Kaye manages to make love *with* the public—and this, so to speak, in private: a theatre critic who enters here is disturbing the privacy of Mr. Kaye's amours. If Danny Kaye has his private experience in public, I once had occasion to note that the converse is also true: in private he is very public. On this occasion, at least, his eyes were glazed; focussed, if at all, on a distant spot. He proved unable to perform before a small, intimate audience, with all faces visible. He said he needed a mass audience or couldn't summon his energies. Individuals had to merge in the mass. If that's democracy, it sounds too much like people's democracy to me.

Of course it is unfair to pick on Mr. Kaye either. My grudge is not against him or Miss Booth but only against those who confuse these amorous carryings-on with theatre. Not to be unfair yet again, the emotional relations of a stage personality and his audience provide *a kind* of theatre. One can complain only if this kind pushes out the other kinds. And this with the support of professional writers on the subject. That there is a public which wouldn't know the difference between a Danny Kaye and a Charlie Chaplin—or which might even prefer Danny Kaye—is merely unfortunate. That those who write on theatre should be equally undiscriminating is a scandal. There are fewer and fewer people who can tell the difference between an attractive personality and a talent for acting. Yet the two are in no way correlative!

All this is by way of deploring the present habit of writers on theatre simply to state that they have lost their hearts to a given actress, that they love and adore her, etc., etc. They have a right to their love but they have no right to a lover's inarticulateness. Perhaps I should include myself in a general condemnation and say that when I look back over my two years' reviews for *NR* I am desolated to see so few words devoted to actors and acting. How little dramatic criticism gets beyond the review of the school play with its pious list of names, the reward of each a single epithet!

And I am not merely regretting that good performances are so meagerly recognized. Badness in acting is often not spotted these days, and even oftener not mentioned. Because the press is much harder on playwrights, it is a common occurrence in New York that a bad performance of a good play is called a good performance of a bad play. When an actor ruins a play, many of the critics can be relied on to say that the play is poor but that this actor is splendid.

I submit that any reviewer who presumes to judge an actor should ask the following questions. First: is his interpretation in line with the author's intentions? At present this question is never asked in the case of new plays because it is believed that a critic should not have read the script; hence that he should not know what the author's intentions are. Second: if the interpretation is not simply conterminous with the author's ideas, is this good or bad? If the actor has added or subtracted, was the result good or bad? Third: aside from all questions of interpretation, was tonight's performance alive? Shylock can be newly, correctly, profoundly interpreted and still not be given a good performance. I don't only mean when the part is played by a bad actor but also when it is played by a good actor whose performance tonight (maybe not last night) was lifeless. From these three main questions, we can proceed to many others. Is the performance alive only in moments or continuously? If it is sustained throughout the evening, has it the right shape, the right curve, from the first scene to the last?

Defending myself and others, I should add that to write meaningfully about actors requires more space than the journalist critic even on the weeklies has at his disposal. The only critic who seems to have enough room is Mr. Wolcott Gibbs and he evidently prefers telling the story of the play.

ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► D. H. Lawrence and Subversion

On March 10, Houston newspapers announced that Peter Jaeger, a 30-year-old Reagan High School English teacher, had been suspended from his post. The charge — "anti-Americanism." Jaeger had read to his classes excerpts from D. H. Lawrence's *Studies In Classic American Literature,* in which the late British author poked fun at Benjamin Franklin's *Thirteen Moral Points.* The charges and suspension came four months after Jaeger had read the Lawrence material.

Mr. Jaeger said he precipitated the action when he went to Principal R. H. Williams to inquire about rumors that he was being "investigated." Later, he stated, Williams and Assistant Superintendent of Schools J. O. Webb proceeded to label him a Communist and anti-American, and remind him that "Lawrence was a Communist, his literature was un-American, and its possession implied advocacy of overthrowing the government." "They gave me the choice of resigning quietly or being smeared," Jaeger said. "I chose to fight the charges."

Jaeger says his refusal to sign a petition opposing the National Education Association's investigation of growing "unrest in Houston schools" is the actual cause of his firing. "I think my acknowledgment that an investigation was needed was construed as being against Webb and Williams, personally," he said.

By the week's end, another Reagan English teacher, Robert Gilmore, had been fired on similar charges, and Jaeger had entered a $75,000 slander suit against Williams, Webb, and Assistant Principal Harlan G. Andrews. Both Williams and Webb denied accusing Jaeger of being a Communist, said they merely questioned the appropriateness of the material. But the publicly-broadcasted School Board hearing disclosed that they had been sufficiently suspicious to check Jaeger's record with the un-American Activities Committee, New York City Police, and the Mexico City Police, where the teacher had formerly attended school. The inquiry revealed no evidence against Jaeger.

"Had I been forewarned by school officials that my outside material was considered inappropriate," Jaeger said, "I would have gladly discontinued using it. The classes were amused by Lawrence's comments, and seemed to enjoy reading the works of outside authors."

Public response has been aroused, much of it in favor of Jaeger's position. A number of his former students have threatened a demonstration protesting his firing. Students and biographers of D. H. Lawrence jumped to defend the author's works against charges of Communism. A letter by Lawrence's widow, now living in Taos, N. M., protested the charges in violent terms and pointed out that Lawrence is suppressed in Communist countries. In the opposing camp were various civic organizations, notable among them—the Minute Women.

The Jaeger case occurred within two weeks of reports in the local press that Assistant Superintendent J. O. Webb had ordered the removal of all books of art containing nudes; refuted the right of students to enroll in life classes at Houston's Art Museum; and refused permission for a visiting Cuban educator to enter white high schools.

CHARLES GALLENKAMP

Houston, Texas

► Atomic Retaliation

Your magnificent editorial, "The Bang Gets Bigger—Why?" should be reprinted in every newspaper in this country.

While we are frantically absorbed in a mania to produce a bigger bomb with a bigger bang, our cities remain wide open to attack. Is there no defense against H Bomb? And if not, why aren't we doing something more about it?

Incidentally, I thought that your entire April 5th issue of *New Republic* was tops!

ERIC SANDER

West Milwaukee, Wisconsin

• • •

In your editorial of March 29 on the Dulles doctrine of "instant retaliation" and in Hans J. Morgenthau's brilliant article in the same issue, the following points are clearly established: (1) The United States does not have unlimited power to stop "local aggressions." According to Morgenthau, not "more than one local aggression at a time by local means." (2) The policy of atomic retaliation can "work" only if there is "not a shadow of doubt in the minds of friend and foe alike about what will happen in the case of local aggression." (3) But in this case, if a local situation arises, as it well may, which seems to the aggressor important enough to warrant armed intervention or what will be so regarded by the United States, then the aggressor is, in effect, forced "to start a war of atomic prevention against the threat of a war of atomic retaliation."

What all this adds up to is that unless the world is rid of atomic weapons, no way to avert war is in sight. The deterrent effect of weapons in an atomic arms race is cancelled out by their provocative effect and the premium offered to the surprise attack.

A. J. MUSTE

New York City

• • •

Your editorial of April 5 suggests reflection on the concept "massive retaliation." Is the threat of massive retaliation a genuine deterrent? Prime Minister Churchill suggested in the House of Commons last November 3 that "when the advance of destructive weapons enables everyone to kill everybody else, nobody will want to kill anyone at all." Perhaps in the present state of the world this is the best that can be done for peace but I think it is clear that it doesn't offer a very secure security.

What are the circumstances under which the Soviet Union might not be deterred? Two at once occur to the mind—if it thought we were bluffing and wouldn't actually resort to "massive retaliation," and if it thought we were about to embark upon aggression and consequently, hazardous as it might be, the Soviets would act, to gain the advantage of the initiative. Are either of these contingencies likely? One should consider the state of mind of our defense authorities if the Soviets should begin direct aid to Ho Chi Minh or should embark upon a border invasion in Iran, Greece, or somewhere else. Would the Pentagon at once decide to start dropping super bombs on Russian cities with the knowledge that this would precipitate another world war, that the Soviets are capable of dropping super bombs on our cities, and that,

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being more urban than the Soviets, we are more vulnerable. And with reference to the second contingency, how does the Kremlin regard our establishment of bases in Pakistan, Greenland, and elsewhere, our development of super-super bombs, and the occasional assertion of supposedly responsible statesmen that continuous coexistence of communism and democracy in one small world is impossible? Are the Soviets certain that our intentions are solely defensive, especially when they have authoritative utterances of their prophets that inevitably the capitalist countries, as they approach inevitable dissolution, will initiate aggressive war against the Communist citadel. I do not know of any easy remedy for the situation. But it seems to me that "massive retaliation," even with 12 megaton bombs, will not do very much to quiet the anxieties in this country on which McCarthy feeds.

QUINCY WRIGHT

Chicago, Illinois

► Johnson Coming Up

I'd like to give my hearty thanks to *New Republic* for Gerald W. Johnson's "The Superficial Aspect." It's rapidly becoming a strong rival with "Washington Wire" as a weekly MUST in my reading.

LESTER L. KUMP

Provo, Utah

► McCarthy Really Said . . .

As a new subscriber to *New Republic* (by presentation) I am almost at once discouraged by the fact that your publication includes a letter from Metek Volk (April 5 issue) containing a complete misstatement. . . .

To quote from Mr. Volk's letter (obviously referring to Senator McCarthy and General Zwicker) ". . . and tell him that he isn't fit to wear that uniform." The official transcript which Mr. Volk has apparently not taken the trouble to verify reads: "Any man . . . promoted to General . . . who says, 'I will protect another general who protected Communists,' is not fit to wear that uniform, General.". . .

If General Zwicker chose to put the cap on because it fitted him that was his choice but the official transcript nowhere contains any statement by Senator McCarthy as attributed to him by Mr. Volk.

WAYLAND M. MINOT

Belmont, Massachusetts

► Raps NR Knuckles

I am glad that the *New Republic* is out of money, and I hope that it folds up. Since what I have seen happen in Russia and since I remember the support the *New Republic* gave to the Russian line, I feel it has been an ally of Communism and radicalism and New Dealism. . . .

The *New Republic* has not been a fearless magazine, for you refused to publish advertisements which were against orthodox religious beliefs, and I cannot have any confidence in a so-called free press which is under the domination of orthodox religion as well as under the orthodox of radical unionism.

JAMES H. JOHNSON

San Diego, California

► Approves Broadmindedness

I just by chance read an old issue, November 30, 1953, in which "The Trial of Harry Truman" appeared. I enjoyed this broadminded article so much that I am enclosing check for one year subscription to your magazine.

THOMAS M. COX

Clarksville, Tennessee

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

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

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

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

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